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NAFTA and the Petrochemical Industry:
A Disastrous Combination for Life at the
U.S.-Mexico Border
There is a neighborhood in Mexico, about three miles from
Brownsville, Texas, near Matamoros, Mexico, that is not considered
part of Matamoros. It is a "colonia" 1 which exists in the unoccupied
area between two United States (U.S.) owned maquiladoras 2 which
produce petrochemicals.'
The one-room family homes which comprise the colonia are
dirt-floored shacks built from wood strips and packing crates. The
fifteen foot square shacks house three-generation families and do not
provide electricity, running water or sewerage. To compensate for
the lack of running water, employees of the petrochemical plants are
allowed to take home discarded steel drums in order to store water.
These drums were previously used to transport hazardous waste gen-
erated by the petrochemical plants, as is evidenced by the U.S. com-
panies' logos still visible on the steel sides. The water stored in these
containers is used for drinking water and bathing, but it is taken
from a stream where swimming has been prohibited by the Mexican
government. Discarded waste from the petrochemical plants clutters
the banks of the stream and the water resembles a brownish-sludge.
This unattended hazardous waste deposited by the petrochemi-
1. See J. Michael Kennedy, Teeming Colonias'; Border has Worst of Both Worlds,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1989, at Al. Colonias are unauthorized subdivisions of U.S. and Mexican
border cities. Approximately 140,000 people have bought small parcels of land and tried to
build a home along dirt roads, seeking the promise of a better life in the United States.
Colonia residents live without running water or sewers and often, the wells dug for water have
been contaminated by nearby septic tanks. In one colonia, two-thirds of the residents had
contracted hepatitis by the time they were 35. Id.
2. See Patrick McDonnell, Border Boom Feeding Hazardous-Waste Ills; U.S., Mexican
Environmental Agencies Push to Quantify Problems and Identify Polluters, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
10, 1989, at B1. Maquiladoras are 100 per cent foreign owned companies which may import
all raw materials, machinery, equipment, and components required for production, free of
Mexican import duties. Upon completion, the maquiladora may export all products to any
other country. Id.
3. See Helene M. Cole, Renal Toxicity of Xylene, 261 JAMA 2258 (1989). Petrochemi-
cals are volatile organic solvents that are easily absorbed through respiratory, gastrointestinal,
or dermal routes. Upon absorption, petrochemicals readily cross the blood-brain barrier, pro-
ducing a variety of central nervous system effects. Workers in the U.S. who have undergone
long-term exposure to low levels of petrochemicals reported increased symptoms of fatigue,
difficulty concentrating, and headaches. Id. See also Turning Environmental Problems into
Profits, UPI, Mar. 26, 1991, available in LExis, Nexis Library, UPI File. Petrochemicals are
used in the manufacture and production of goods including plastics, pesticides and petroleum
products. Id.
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cal companies has caused serious health and environmental problems
along the entire U.S.-Mexico border area. The colonia which occu-
pies the space between the two U.S. companies has been evacuated
-twice in the past two years due to accelerated levels of contamina-
tion resulting from environmental misconduct. These evacuations
were only temporary and when the colonia residents returned, they
continued to be exposed to hazardous levels of chemical pollution.
Since January 1991, thirty-six cases of anencephaly have been re-
ported in Matamoros."
The situation discussed above raises some precarious questions.
What if one of the petrochemical plants has a hazardous chemical
waste accident resulting in serious environmental and health conse-
quences on the U.S. side? Would the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) provide for any sanctions? Would the Mexi-
can Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) be able to take any
effective action against the maquiladora? Would the U.S. govern-
ment have any power to penalize or regulate the U.S.-owned com-
pany operating in Mexico?
I. Introduction
This Comment will discuss the issues relating to the preceding
questions in a light that focuses on the introductory hypothetical sit-
uation. Section I describes the maquiladora program and its effects
on the environment at the U.S.-Mexico border. Additionally, it will
introduce the environmental and health problems that the pe-
trochemical industry produces through the maquiladora program.
Section II analyzes NAFTA's failure to address the environmental
problems created by the petrochemical industry. Section III dis-
cusses the reasons behind Sedesol's failure to enforce Mexico's envi-
ronmental protection laws. Section IV addresses potential legal solu-
tions to redress the environmental and personal damage sustained as
a result of the petrochemical companies' unsound environmental
practices. Finally, Section V discusses a variety of structural adjust-
ments that would begin to solve the problems caused by the pe-
trochemical industry at the U.S.-Mexico border.
4. See What is Anencephaly? BORDER CAMPAIGN BACKGROUND ARTICLE #1 (Border
Campaign, Brownsville, TX) 1992. Anencephaly is a fatal birth defect in which babies are
born with either incomplete or missing brains and skulls. The infant usually dies at birth or
within a few days. Increasing scientific data points to certain toxins, including petrochemicals,
as likely causes. This coincides with the discovery of high levels of petrochemicals, such as
xylene, in the Rio Grande River and on land near maquiladoras in Matamoros. The quantities
discovered were many thousands of times higher than U.S. EPA standards. Id.
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11. The Maquiladora Program and the Effects of the Petrochemical
Industry on Environmental and Health Issues
A. The Maquiladora Program
In 1965, Mexico implemented the Border Industrialization Pro-
gram in an effort to revitalize its economy and employment levels.5
This plan gave birth to the maquiladora program which generates
approximately $3 billion of foreign exchange earnings for the Mexi-
can economy each year.' This amount is more than the tourism in-
dustry and second only to Mexico's oil and gas exports.7 In the past
decade, practically all newly created manufacturing jobs resulted
from the growth of the maquiladora program.'
The maquiladora program consists of approximately 1800 facto-
ries in northern Mexico, employing half a million workers, and
stretches from Tijuana, south of San Diego, CA, to Matamoros, bor-
dering Brownsville, TX.9 Foreign owners include IBM, General
Electric, Motorola, Ford, Chrysler, General Motors, RCA, United
Technologies, ITT, Eastman Kodak and Zenith, as well as a number
of Japanese and European companies.10 Mexico attracts these pow-
erful companies because of inexpensive labor and its more lenient
environmental laws." The total production costs are also an incen-
tive for manufacturers because of tax, insurance, and wage bene-
fits. 12 Although Mexico has strengthened its industrial pollution
standards, several Mexican officials indicated that they are taking a
flexible approach to enforcement against maquiladoras.'a That flexi-
bility results from the maquiladora program's creation of jobs and
revenue for Mexico's lagging economy.' 4 Many regulatory and bu-
5. See Joseph LaDou, Deadly Migration: Hazardous Industries' Flight to the Third
World; Environmental Impact of Shift of Manufacturing Operations to Ill-prepared Develop-
ing Countries, 94 TECH. REV. 46, 49 (1991).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. A fifth of the country's total number of manufacturing jobs resulted from the
rapid growth of the maquiladoras. Id. at 50.
9. Joseph LaDou, Deadly Migration: Hazardous Industries' Flight to the Third
World: Environmental Impact of Shift of Manufacturing Operations to Ill-prepared Develop-
ing Countries, 94 TECH. REV. 46, 49 (1991).
10. Id.
11. See Chris Kraul, A Warmer Climate for Furniture Makers; Mexico: Fleeing Anti-
Smog Laws, Some Los Angeles Manufacturers Flock South, Where Environmental Laws are
Less Restrictive, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1990, at DI.
12. Id. Furniture manufacturers pay Mexican workers about 25 per cent of what work-
ers in Southern California receive. U.S. companies also avoid paying high workers' compensa-
tion insurance premiums to Mexican laborers. Id.
13. Id. Rene Altamirano Perez, general director of the Secretaria de Desarrallo Urbano
y Ecologia (SEDUE) (Mexico's former equivalent of the U.S. EPA), said, "[P]reviously, Mex-
ico had been more concerned about the maquiladoras in terms of the employment that they
create for many people without jobs, particularly women and campesinos (farm workers),
raiher than the environmental hazards relating to industrial processes." Id.
14. Chris Kraul, A Warmer Climate for Furniture Makers; Mexico: Fleeing Anti-Smog
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reaucratic barriers have been eased to enhance the size of the pro-
gram because it is one of Mexico's few economic hopes.15 In addi-
tion, Mexico's President Salinas ordered the government to expedite
the maquiladora permit process because Mexico does not want to
send negative signs to potential, and badly needed foreign
investors.
16
B. Environmental and Health Ramifications
In 1988, the Mexican government passed an extensive set of
new environmental laws, based on U.S. statutes, which provided for
closures of maquiladoras, fines up to $100,000 and jail terms for
company officials. 7 EPA officials assert that the laws and regula-
tions are comparable to those in the United States. 8 However, a
lack of resources make environmental enforcement a seemingly end-
less problem for Mexican officials who must regulate 120,000 facili-
ties nationwide.' 9 In 1992, Sedesol increased the environmental pro-
tection budget for the border area by 450 per cent and the number
of border environmental inspectors to 200.20 However, in Nuevo
Laredo, the town across the border from El Paso, Texas, twenty-five
million gallons of raw sewage are pumped into the Rio Grande River
on a daily basis.2' Like other "colonias", half of Nuevo Laredo's
thirty garbage dumps are located along the river.2 Swimming is
banned, but the residents on both sides of the border continue to use
the river for drinking water.
23
The maquiladoras which use and produce petrochemicals not
only pose a risk to the environment, but they also present serious
health risks to those who suffer from exposure. Courts have found
Laws, Some Los Angeles Manufacturers Flock South, Where Environmental Laws are Less
Restrictive, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1990 at Dl.
15. McDonnell, supra note 2, at BI. Number of maquiladora plants in Tijuana: 1983:
140; 1984: 167; 1985: 203; 1986: 267; 1987: 317; 1988: 388; 1989: 450. Tijuana Work Force:
1983: 19,239; 1984: 24,473; 1985: 24,815; 1986: 31,793; 1987: 40,409; 1988: 51, 496; 1989:
60,000. Id.
16. Kraul, supra note 11, at DI.
17. McDonnell, supra note 2, at BI.
18. See SUSAN FLETCHER & MARY TIEMANN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EN-
VIRONMENT & TRADE (July 28, 1992) at 8. The comprehensive environmental protection law
increased federal responsibility to issue regulations and set standards on a wide range of envi-
ronmental matters. Sedesol has issued regulations covering air pollution, solid waste disposal,
environmental impact assessment and automobile emissions control. Furthermore, Mexican
leaders have increased the resources allocated to environmental protection; from 1989 to 1991,
Mexico's environment and natural resources budget grew from roughly $6 million to $36 mil-
lion. In 1991, the number of environmental inspectors increased from 19 to 100, with 50 hired
specifically for the border area. Id. at 9.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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petrochemicals such as xylene, benzene, and toluene to be hazardous
substances. 4 Chemical contamination resulting from releases of xy-
lene has compelled the EPA to classify some of the areas on the
National Priority List, which lists the most seriously contaminated
hazardous waste sites in the United States. 6 Therefore, if pe-
trochemical plants operating in Mexico are contaminating the envi-
ronment to the extent that their effects are felt on the U.S. side of
the border, it is likely that Mexican employees are constantly ex-
posed to hazardous chemicals throughout the workday. Furthermore,
the fact that the employees store drinking water in containers used
to transport chemicals and chemical waste implies that the employ-
ees' families are also suffering from constant exposure to these
chemicals.1
6
In the United States, personal injury suits have been brought
for exposure to the same petrochemicals that Mexican employees
work with on a continual basis in the maquiladoras. An independent
contractor performing services at a Texas oil company was awarded
$25,000 for personal injuries suffered is a result of exposure to pet-
rochemicals such as benzene, toluene, and xylene during one day of
work. 7 In another case, an employee recovered worker's compensa-
tion for continuous exposure to petrochemicals, through ingestion
and inhalation, of toluene, xylene, hexane and heptane, while per-
forming his duties in a rubber processing plant.2"
Not only have the U.S. courts labeled petrochemicals as hazard-
ous to the environment and industry employees' health, but they
have also allowed recovery for personal injury claims brought as a
result of exposure to these petrochemicals. Consequently, significant
health risks are imposed upon Mexicans employed in maquiladoras
which use and produce petrochemicals.
24. See Transportation Leasing Co. v. State, No. 89-7368-WMB, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20734, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
25. See Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1553 (9th Cir.
1991). Xylene has also been classified as a hazardous substance under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988).
26. See LaDou, supra note 5, at 51.
27. See Marathon Oil Col. v. Sterner, 624 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). After
smelling a "rotten odor" for ten to fifteen seconds in the vessel in which the-employee was
working, he developed a severe headache, began dry heaving and defecated on himself. Id.
28. See Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 467 N.E.2d 1378, 1380-81 (Ohio Ct. App.
1983). The employee was diagnosed as suffering from "[dliffuse pulmonary infiltrate, bilateral,
probably secondary to chemical pneumonitis". Id.
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III. Potential Effects of NAFTA's Failure to Address the Problems
Created by the Petrochemical Industry
A. The Completion of NAFTA Negotiations
A free trade agreement between the United States and Canada
went into effect on January 1, 1989.29 In June 1990 President Bush
and President Salinas of Mexico agreed to begin negotiations for a
bilateral free trade 'agreement.30 One year later, trade ministers from
the United States, Canada, and Mexico formally began negotiating
a North American free trade agreement.31 This agreement, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by all
three countries on August 12, .1992, is scheduled to take effect on
January 1, 1994.2 Formal negotiations began in June 1991, after
Congress extended through May 1993, the fast-track negotiation au-
thority."3 This allows the President to negotiate an agreement that
Congress can either adopt or reject, but can not amend. 34 Currently,
NAFTA has been signed by all three member countries, and is now
under consideration by Congress."
Under NAFTA, no country may impose a tax, duty or charge
on the export of energy or basic petrochemical goods unless the same
tax or duty is applied to identical goods consumed domestically. As
Mexico has reduced tariffs and opened its economy, chemical im-
ports and exports in the United States have rapidly increased." The
implementation of NAFTA will provide for further expansion of
chemical trade between the U.S. and Mexico. NAFTA's removal of
barriers to trade will completely open a large market for chemical
products in Mexico. 8
29. CONGRESSIONAL REFERENCE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Mex-
ico-U.S.-Canada: North American Free Trade Agreement, IP 445M (1992).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Stuart Auerbach, U.S., Canada and Mexico Agree to Form Trade Bloc, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 1992, at A12.
33. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY. THE WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet, The North
American Free Trade Agreement, [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (Aug. 12, 1992).
34. Id.
35. See Auerbach, supra note 32, at AI2. Congress has 90 days from the date of sub-
mission to draft legislation that will implement the agreement into law. Congress then has 90
legislative days, which could stretch out for as long as eight months, to adopt or reject the
implementing legislation for the treaty. Id.
36. See Petrochemicals One of Major NAFTA Winners for U.S. Industry, II INT'L
PETROCHEMICAL REP. 8 (1992).
37. See Charles Berry, Mexican Producers: Wary of Life After NAFTA, CHEM. WEEK,
Sept. 9, 1992, at 9. Last year, the United States exported $2.62 billion worth of chemicals to
Mexico, an increase of 83 per cent since 1987. Mexico's export of chemicals to the U.S.
reached $721 million, an increase of 84 per cent. Id.
38. See Andrew Wood, Elizabeth S. Kiesche & Ronald Begley, NAFTA: Weighing the
Benefits of North American Free Trade, CHEM. WEEK, Aug. 26, 1992, at 15. Mexico is al-
ready the third largest chemical trading partner of the U.S. and a wave of investment in
Mexican goods headed for the U.S. will spur chemical growth. Id.
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The potential for rapid expansion of the chemical trade under
NAFTA is evidenced by Mexico's recent removal of foreign invest-
ment restrictions on approximately seventy petrochemicals." Under
the Mexican constitution, foreign investment is limited to secondary
petrochemicals. "° Foreign investors can only produce secondary pet-
rochemicals after obtaining a permit from the Ministry of Energy,
Mines and Parastate Industry.,1 A group of petrochemicals was re-
cently reclassified as secondary, thereby opening them to foreign
investment.4
Along with the liberalization of Mexico's petrochemical indus-
try, Pemex has begun to establish joint ventures with foreign inves-
tors to build chemical production plants in Mexico.43 With the in-
crease in free trade and number of joint ventures in the chemical
industry, NAFTA will inevitably lead to a significant increase in pe-
trochemical production and use in the manufacturing sector. Cur-
rently, some Mexican business operators claim that the Mexican
chemical industry is relatively small and is therefore not a significant
health or environmental hazard." However, the increase in produc-
tion and industry use of petrochemicals is likely to result in a signifi-
cant acceleration of chemical accidents. With major growth in the
industry, the potential for more severe chemical accidents will accel-
erate at a rate that an already dangerous industry can not afford. As
a result, increased environmental hazards in the border area will also
exacerbate the problem to uncontrollable levels. In the past, the
Mexican government has acquiesced to environmental and health
hazards because of the importance of the petrochemical industry to
the maquiladora program.45 Consequently, NAFTA will enhance the
39. See Karen Heller, North America: Free At Last?, CHEM. WEEK, Aug. 19, 1992, at
9. There are only a few petrochemicals still restricted to foreign investment: ethane, butane,
heptane, hexane, pentane, naptha, methane and propane. These chemicals can only be pro-
duced in Mexico through Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) or its subsidiaries or affiliated compa-
nies, wholly owned by the Mexican government. Id.
40. See Private Companies Could Produce 57 Petrochemicals Under New Law, No-
TIMEX MEX. NEWS SERVICE, July 17, 1992.
41. See NAFTA Meets Most of ISAC's Requirements, II INT'L PETROCHEMICAL REP.
4 (1992).
42. Id. This list includes: acetylene, ammonia, benzene, butadiene, butylenes, ethylene,
methanol, n-paraffins, orthoxylene, paraxylene, propylene, toluene, .and xylene. Id.
43. Andrew Wood & Rick Mullin, Valero and Vista Set to Join Petchem Ventures in
Mexico, CHEM. WEEK, Sept. 16, 1992, at 8. Pemex selected Valero Energy (Houston) to join a
500,000-m.t./year methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) venture, and is close to completing a deal
with Vista Chemical (Houston) for a linear alkybenzene (LAB) unit. Id.
44. See Leslie Layton, Mexico's Responsabilidad Integral: A High-Stake Move, CHEM.
WEEK, Dec. 11, 1991, at 60. Luis Hierro Romero, head of the safety, hygiene and environ-
mental protection commission at ICI do Mexico, a Mexican Chemical Company, said, "while
accidents in Mexico's chemical industry are more frequent, they are less severe due to the
operations' comparative smallness. Id.
, 45. Id. DuPont attempted to move families out of a two-mile zone around Quimica
Fluor's hydrofluoric acid plant in Matamoros, in which it had a 33 per cent control. A presi-
dential decree prohibited forced evacuation but also banned new residential development there.
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likelihood of hazardous chemical accidents and increase the threat to
the health of its citizens and the environment. These dangerous ef-
fects may be accepted by the Mexican government as the cost for
increased foreign investment.
NAFTA has been embraced by the signatory countries with
many high ambitions and expectations.4 6 Some government and in-
dustry economists view the provisions regarding basic petrochemicals
and energy trade and investment as a disappointment because they
fail to meet the objectives of many analysts.4" The Advisory Com-
mittee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), however, as-
serts that while its negotiating objectives for environmental protec-
tion were limited in scope, their goals have been greatly exceeded by
NAFTA. 48 During the negotiation process, governments of the sig-
natory countries increasingly came to the realization that expansive
trade and environmental protection can not be separated.49 Upon the
conclusion of negotiations, the ACTPN asserted that the environ-
mental measures are "unprecedented in a trade agreement and re-
present a significant step toward greater cooperation and greater en-
vironmental protection in North America".50
The strained balance between free trade and the environment
represents one reason that NAFTA failed to provide any explicit en-
vironmental protection provisions. If a country has stricter environ-
mental standards, these standards may be viewed as nontariff trade
Id.
46. See North Am. Free Trade Agreement, REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR
TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS, Sept., I'992. The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy
and Negotiations (ACTPN) consists of leaders from a cross section of industry, including rep-
resentatives from business, labor and an environmental representative. "The ACTPN believes
that the NAFTA is a major, comprehensive, historic endeavor that is in the best economic
*interest of the United States. As a result of this agreement, economic, political and social
relationships between Mexico, Canada and the United States will be fundamentally changed
for the better." Id.
47. Id. at 42.
48. Id. at 81. The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations stated the
following general objectives: U.S. environmental laws and regulations should not be weakened,
initiatives to improve environmental standards and enforcement could best be achieved in par-
allel with NAFTA, and the U.S. should seek to strengthen enforcement of environmental stan-
dards throughout the free trade area. Id.
49. North Am. Free Trade Agreement, REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE
POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS, Sept., 1992.
50. Id. at 81-82. The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations asserts
that the following goals have exceeded the government negotiators prior expectation: the signa-
tories committed themselves to the principles of sustainable development; NAFTA explicitly
assures that U.S. environmental standards will be maintained, and that the signatories will
seek to work toward equivalence at the level of the strictest standards among the parties to the
agreement; NAFTA allows states, provinces, and local governments of the signatories to estab-
lish more stringent environmental standards so long as such standards are applied without
discrimination; NAFTA assures that no signatory will be permitted to relax environmental
standards in order to attract investment; parallel activities such as the U.S.-Mexico Border
Plan and the establishment of a Joint Commission for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment will foster environmental cooperation in areas of standards and enforcement. Id.
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barriers.5 1 Conversely, a lack of effective environmental enforcement
measures may be viewed as an implicit subsidy and an unfair incen-
tive for foreign investment.
52
During negotiations, the U.S. government has taken the position
that NAFTA will help Mexico's foreign debt crisis5" because it will
boost the Mexican economy and provide the government with more
funds for environmental protection measures.5 A major flaw in this
position is that it erroneously assumes that the Mexican government
has the political willpower to allocate large amounts of money to
environmental enforcement when it faces problems that most citizens
will deem more pressing, such as housing, health care and education.
Furthermore, NAFTA does not address the immediate need for
cleaning up the existing contamination on both sides of the border
area.
The U.S. government also claims that a fifty million dollar
World Bank loan to Mexico for environmental protection will be an
effective measure.5 5 Not only will this one-time loan increase Mex-
ico's debt, but only $8 million of this loan will go directly to the
enforcement of environmental laws.56 In addition, 50 million dollars,
if the entire amount were to go to environmental measures, would
not touch even the surface of the minimal requirement of 575 million
dollars needed to match what Texas spends on a per capita basis .5
The U.S. government also points to the temporary and perma-
nent closures of maquiladoras 58 as an increase in Mexican commit-
ment to environmental protection measures. While these closures are
a step in the right direction, they will be hard to continue because
NAFTA does not provide a constant source of funding for these pur-
poses. Moreover, it is likely that some of the temporary closures,
such as those that only lasted two days, did not make any substantial
progress in the fight against maquiladora misconduct.
59
51. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 18, at 6.
52. Id.
53. See NAFTA and U.S./Mexico Border Environment: Options for Congress, (Tex.
Center for Pol'y Studies, Austin, TX) Sept. 1992, at I-I. Mexico's foreign debt has been
increasing recently and is now over $100 billion. Mexico's debt service in 1990 was 27.8 per
cent of the value of its exports. Mexico is also the largest borrower from the World Bank. Id.
54. See Fact Sheet, supra note 33. Economic reforms in Mexico have resulted in a drop
in the inflation rate. from over 100 per cent in 1986 to under 20 per cent in 1991, and its
economy has grown at an average rate of 3.1 per cent over the last four years, after stagnating
during the 1980's. From 1986-91, U.S. exports to Mexico increased from $12.4 billion to $33.3
billion, twice as fast as U.S. exports to the rest of the world. Id.
55. See NAFTA and U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 1-1.
56. Id.
57. Id. In 1988, Texas spent $575 million on environmental protection ($6.78 per cap-
ita). Texas was 50th out of the U.S. states in spending on the environment. Id.
58. See Mexico's New Environmental Agency on the Move in First 100 Days, NOTIMEX
MEX. NEws SERVICE, Sept. 21, 1992.
59. Id.
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Due to the anticipated increase in trade, NAFTA will generate
rapid industrial growth in Mexico, especially in the border area. The
border area represents a favorable choice for U.S. corporations be-
cause of its proximity to the U.S. markets. Industrial growth under
NAFTA will enhance the existing uncontrollable environmental
problems caused by petrochemical plants and other maquiladoras in
the border area. Even prior to NAFTA negotiations, industrial de-
velopment stemming from the maquiladora program and the affili-
ated population explosion surpassed the Mexican government's at-
tempts at establishing an environmental protection infrastructure." °
As a result, sewage and industrial wastewater treatment are fre-
quently inadequate and improperly handled wastes from the maqui-
ladoras contaminate drinking supplies.61 These pollution hazards and
the transboundary movement of hazardous waste is also causing seri-
ous air and water contamination in the U.S., forcing some border
areas to violate U.S. environmental laws. 6
2
The U.S. also applauds its relationship with the newly formed
Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) and their prospects for en-
vironmental protection. However, the relationship is nothing more
than an informal agreement to protect the environment." If the ex-
isting relationship is evaluated based on the present quality of the
border environment and threats to public health, the arrangement is
clearly ineffective. In light of NAFTA's failure to define specific en-
vironmental provisions to solve current problems, the EPA and
Sedesol need to design a formal binding arrangement that provides
for a constant flow of funds, resources, information and personnel
aimed specifically at environmental protection measures at the
border.
B. Recent Developments Under NAFTA
Despite completion of the NAFTA negotiations, the treaty's im-
plementation will not be a simple process. NAFTA, negotiated by
former U.S. and Canadian leaders, George Bush and Brian Mulro-
ney, presently faces two new administrations which will attempt to
enact the treaty. The Clinton administration announced that it plans
to implement NAFTA by January 1, 1994. 6" However, the adminis-
tration has repeatedly said that while it will not reopen negotiations
on the treaty, it will not send NAFTA to Congress for consideration
60. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 18, at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 2-1.
64. See Union Leaders Sharply Criticize NAFTA Before House Ways and Means Sub-
committee, DAILY LAB. REP.. BNA, Mar. 12, 1993, at A14.
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without effective supplemental agreements.68 Proposed supplemental
agreements to NAFTA are expected to focus on Mexico and address
environmental protection, labor. standards and the sharp import
surges that will result from the reduction of tariffs and trade
barriers. 6
Carol Browner, director, . U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, expressed optimism toward the first round of negotiations
on supplemental agreements to NAFTA, but described them as
"very preliminary". 7 The purpose behind the supplemental agree-
ments is to provide a mechanism that will work.toward upward har-
monization of environmental and labor standards between the par-
ties.68 The agreement on labor standards is expected to address poor
working conditions in Mexico and the fear of job losses in the United
States. 9 The agreement on environmental protection is expected to
address long-term funding of border cleanup and infrastructure im-
provement, as well as the creation of a North American Commission
on the Environment (NACE) and assurances that all parties-are en-
forcing their national environmental laws."0 While the Clinton ad-
ministration adamantly supports the supplemental agreements, a
senior member of President Salinas de Gortari's government said
that Mexico would "walk away from the table if the U.S. demands
were deemed excessive."
7 1
IV. Sedesol's Failure to Enforce Environmental Protection Laws
In an effort to reorganize Mexican governmental functions and
revitalize environmental protection, the Ministry of Social Develop-
ment (Sedesol) replaced the Secretaria de Desarrallo Urbano y Eco-
65. Id.
66. See David R. Sands, Talks End on Trade Pact Amendments, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
19, 1993, at Cl. Canadian negotiator John Weekes said that both Canada and Mexico ques-
tioned the need for a side agreement on import surges, noting that there are provisions in the
NAFTA text already addressing the question. He also said that the emphasis was on the
environment and labor. Id.
67. See NAFTA, Browner Expresses Optimism About First Round of Side Pact Talks,
DAILY REP. EXEC.. BNA, Mar. 19, 1993. On March 17, 1993, NAFrA parties conducted first
round negotiations on a supplemental agreement on labor. On March 18, 1993, the parties met
to discuss an environmental side agreement. Id.
68. See Negotiations on Supplemental NAFTA Pacts Will Not be Rushed, Official
Says, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, BNA, Mar. 19, 1993.
69. See Union Leaders Sharply Criticize NAFTA, supra note 64. Ron Carey, president,
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, said NAFTA, as it is currently negotiated, would
enable Mexican truck drivers making seven dollars per day to drive freight to U.S. cities,
displacing U.S. drivers making up to seventeen dollars per hour. Carey called for the supple-
mental agreement to include minimum labor standards, a mechanism and schedule for closing
the U.S.-Mexico wage gap, protection for workers' rights, a supra-governmental enforcement
process and a cross-border transaction tax that would provide adjustment aid to workers and
communities. Id.
70. See NAFTA, Browner Expresses Optimism, supra note 67.
71. Sands, supra note 66, at C I.
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logia (SEDUE) as the Mexican counterpart to the U.S. EPA.7 2 In
its first one hundred days of existence, Sedesol embarked on what
appeared to be a stringent environmental protection crusade aimed
at forcing compliance by U.S.-owned maquiladoras.73 Inspections re-
sulted in seven permanent closures and the temporary closure of 109
facilities pending compliance with existing Mexican laws.74 Sedesol
made public participation in environmental protection activities part
of its agenda. The Ministry placed an assistant attorney general in
command of a new office who has formalized complaint and follow-
up procedures for environmental infractions.75 The Attorney Gen-
eral's Office also began to conduct environmental audits which target
highly polluting industries.
7 6
Despite Sedesol's recent efforts, Mexico lacks the resources to
wage an effective campaign for the enforcement of environmental
measures. First, Mexico must contend with severe financial restraints
which detract from its ability to regulate the maquiladora industry.77
Second, political constraints place harsh limitations on governmental
measures to stop the maquiladoras from violating environmental
laws.7 8 Due to the tremendous amount of foreign revenue the maqui-
ladoras produce, the Mexican government enthusiastically supports
the maquiladora program.79 Consequently, Mexican environmental
agencies are in a precarious situation. If Sedesol attempts to force
maquiladoras to comply with environmental standards, the govern-
ment may reduce the agency's already insubstantial budget.80 If mu-
nicipal governments consider complaining about hazardous waste
dumping, unsafe working conditions, poor sewage treatment facili-
ties, or medical care, the owners of the maquiladoras may move the
72. See Mexico's New Environmental Agency, supra note 58.
73. Id.
74. Id. 202 inspections took place in the Mexico City Metropolitan Zone; 52 at maqui-
ladora plants along the U.S. border; 32 additional inspections in Matamoros; 14 in Veracruz;
17 in the Pacific port of Lazaro Cardenas; 12 in Queretaro and 11 at toxic waste disposal
facilities throughout the country. Id.
75. Id. The Attorney General is currently investigating 269 complaints. As of Sept. 21,
1992, pending complaints included water pollution (20 per cent), other forms of pollution (19
per cent), hazardous activities (14 per cent), illegal tree felling (12 per cent), air pollution (II
per cent), activities endangering protected lands (5 per cent), toxic waste (4 per cent), and
noise pollution (4 per cent). See Mexico's New Environmental Agency, supra note 58.
76. Id. Audits have been conducted in four Pemex petrochemical facilities, one oil refin-
ery, one maritime port complex, and nineteen private sector industries in Coatzacoalcos-Mina-
titalau. Four industrial parks in Matamoros-Reynosa, three in Tijuana-Mexicali, and twenty in
the Mexico City Metropolitan area have been subject to the environmental audits. Id.
77. See LaDou, supra note 5, at 52.
78. Id.
79. Id. Foreign companies and investors have provided for 60 per cent of all industrial
investment in developing countries over the past decade. For Mexico, such investment is the
primary source of new jobs. (The $3 billion produced each year is second only to Mexico's oil
and gas exports.) Id. at 47.
80. Id. at 52.
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plants to less resilient cities or countries." This would result in a
tremendous reduction of the much-needed job-base. These political
constraints were exemplified in May 1989, when SEDUE began to
require all maquiladoras to obtain water discharge permits in order
to comply with Mexico's laws on toxic waste treatment.
82
Despite the monetary and financial constraints that hinder Mex-
ico's attempt to provide environmental protection, the United States
has taken action to help Mexico with its environmental problems and
to clean-up previously polluted areas. The U.S. government, the state
of California and the city of San Diego have agreed to pay most of
the $192 million cost of a treatment plant at the San Diego-Tijuana
border.
83
The United States also implemented the federal Rio Grande
Pollution Correction Act of 1987 in order to solve pollution problems
in that river. 84 Due to its limited scope and lack of financial support,
the act was a disappointment to the environmental community. 8
The Act's virtual failure led to a substantial amount of further pro-
posed legislative attempts. 86
81. LaDou, supra note 5, at 52.
82. Id. With a permit, the plants may dump the treated water into the sewer system,
and any plant violating this requirement can be fined up to $70,000 and those responsible can
be imprisoned for six years. So far, this has produced minimal results, because like most envi-
ronmental laws in developing countries, the threat is made by an agency that lacks the full
backing of its government and the resources to carry out its mission. Id.
83. Id. at 50. Mexico's government lacks the resources to prevent the flow of 10 million
gallons of raw sewage which flows from Mexico into the Tijuana River polluting the beaches
of San Diego every day. Id.
84. The Rio Grande Pollution Correction Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. § 277 (1987).
85. See LaDou, supra note 5, at 52.
86. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 18, at 10-13.
PROPOSED U.S. LEGISLATION:
H.R. 3773, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Directs EPA to establish an office in a community located not more than 10 miles from
the U.S.-Mexico border; Introduced Nov. 13, 1991; referred to Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries.
H.R. 4059, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Amends the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to authorize
additional functions within the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Authorizes the President
to sell at a discount up to 40 per cent of debt owed by seven Latin American nations to the
U.S. Government on the condition that debtor countries commit a specified amount to support"
eligible environmental activities through a new Good Neighbor Environmental Fund or other
existing environmental fund. Establishes a Good Neighbor Environmental Fund for the (U.S.-
Mexico) border to finance environmental improvement projects. Introduced Nov. 26, 1991;
referred to Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 4883, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
Declares that any NAFTA agreement must include the achievement of certain environ-
mental, labor, and agricultural standards as principal U.S. negotiating objectives, including
preventing export of toxic and hazardous products, and products produced under environmen-
tal conditions that undermine comparable standards in the importing country; requires adop-
tion in NAFTA that systematic denial or practical negation of such standards constitutes an
unfair trade practice. Introduced Apr. 9, 1992; referred to Committee on Ways and Means.
H.Con.Res. 247, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Expresses the sense of the Congress that the United States should not enter into any
international agreement, or approve any international report, that would impair U.S. authority
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Unfortunately, none of the actions taken by either the U.S. or
Mexico have attacked the problems at the foundation of the maqui-
to enforce and strengthen environmental, labor, agricultural, and public health and safety
standards. Introduced Nov. 23, 1991; referred to Committee on Ways and Means.
H.Con.Res. 325, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
Expresses sense of Congress that the President should reach an agreement with Mexico on
the development of a bilateral commission to raise money for environmental protection infra-
structure and cleanup projects along the U.S.-Mexico border. Introduced May 27, 1992; re-
ferred to Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Pub-
lic Works and Transportation.
H.Res. 146, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the United States objec-
tives to be achieved in the negotiations of future trade agreements based on the Administra-
tion's May 1, 1991, Presidential response to Congress; reserves the right to rescind fast-track
authority should the Administration fail to address environmental and other issues in NAFTA
negotiations; and advises the President to seek joint solutions to U.S.-Mexico border environ-
mental problems. Introduced May 9, 1991; referred to Committee on Rules and Committee on
Ways and Means. Ordered reported without recommendation by Committee on Rules May 14;
report filed May 15 (H.Rept. 102-64, Part I). Ordered reported favorably with amendments
by Committee on Ways and Means May 14; report filed May 16 (H.Rept. 102-64, Part II).
Passed House May 23, 1991.
H.Res. 149, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that it is imperative that any trade
agreement with Mexico should achieve certain negotiating objectives including those involving
environmental, health, and safety standards; amends House rule with respect to any imple-
menting legislation resulting from trade negotiations. Introduced May 9, 1991; referred to
Committee on Rules and Committee on Ways and Means.
H.Res. 151, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives regarding extending "fast track"
procedures to bills to implement future environmental and labor standards agreements. Intro-
duced May 14, 1991; referred to Committee on Rules and Committee on Ways and Means.
H.Res. 161, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) it should be U.S. policy to
seek in trade negotiations the adoption and enforcement of equivalent environmental standards
among the trading nations of the world; (2) until such policy is implemented, the President
should seek, through the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, and as part of the next round
of GATT and NAFTA negotiations, agreement on mechanisms under which the United States
and its trading partners can eliminate or reduce competitive disadvantages resulting from the
differing national environmental standards; and (3) any agreement regarding such interna-
tional environmental standards would not impair the implementation of U.S. environmental
protection statutes. Introduced May 23, 1991; referred to Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Trade.
S. 59, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
Directs the U.S. Trade Representative, the EPA Administrator, and the National Acad-
emy of Sciences to study the impact on international trade of international environmental
agreements and foreign nation environment, conservation, and health laws. Introduced Jan. 1,
1991; referred to Committee on Finance.
S. 503, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
The United States-Mexico Border Environmental Protection Act establishes a $10 million
emergency fund for environmental cleanup and investigations; directs EPA to establish an ad-
visory committee to monitor and study environmental conditions along the border; and autho-
rizes the Secretary of State, acting through the International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion (IBWC), to conclude agreements with Mexico to correct cross-boundary pollution
problems. Establishes the IBWC Fund to carry out this Act. Introduced Feb. 26, 1991; re-
ferred to Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with amendments favorably
and placed on the legislative calendar on Nov. 19, 1991.
S. 1965, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Amends the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to direct the Secretary of Commerce to
impose fees on all goods imported from countries that do not impose water pollution standards
as stringent as those imposed by the United States. Introduced Nov. 14, 1991; referred to
Committee on Finance.
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ladora program. The most essential step is to raise a consistent
amount of money to provide for constant improvements and struc-
tural changes in the program's infrastructure.8 7 But, since both gov-
ernments embrace the present maquiladora system, any law that at-
tacks the problems at their foundation would lack serious potential
for enactment.8 In reality, Mexico can not be expected to initiate
measures that would present legitimate solutions to the environmen-
tally hazardous activities of the maquiladoras. Mexico, a country
desperate for foreign capital and jobs, is likely to resent any outside
pressure to penalize an industry which represents a major source of
these necessities.
8 9
Currently, the United States uses the maquiladora program as a
place to export obsolete and hazardous technology in order to sustain
a profitable, though disgraceful, enterprise system. Therefore, the
United States and Mexico must design international treaties to re-
place the incentives that pose major threats to the border-area envi-
ronment. The United States must require its companies to follow one
set of environmental and safety standards whether they operate at
home or abroad. The longer environmental damage and unsafe work-
ing conditions continue in the petrochemical plants, the greater the
cost of resolving these problems. By neglecting environmental con-
cerns, U.S. owned companies shift a tremendous burden to Mexico,
who is least able to bear it."0
The laws of Mexico require waste generated by foreign-owned
maquiladoras to be transported back to its country of origin. 1 Re-
cycling is not an option because Mexico does not have the resources
to provide for an effective recycling campaign.9 2 The Texas Water
Commission reports that only sixty percent of the waste produced by
maquiladoras leaves Mexico. The remaining waste is disposed of ille-
gally in Mexico.9 3 When hazardous waste does return to the U.S., it
is often shipped in improperly labeled containers. 4 Those shipments
87. See LaDou, supra note 5, at 52.
88. See Sandy Tolan, From Tijuana to Matamoros, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1990, (Maga-
zine) at 19. "1 see it [the maquiladora program] as a win-win situation for both the U.S. and
Mexico; the maquiladoras promise to bring a golden age on the border," says Representative
Jim Kolbe, one of the industry's chief promoters in Congress, whose southern Arizona district
adjoins the Mexican state of Sonora. Id.
89. LaDou, supra note 5, at 53. In general, developing countries maintain that only
after they have achieved the standard of living of First World countries will they adopt similar
environmental policies. Additionally, these countries do not have well-funded environmental
groups because popular support for actions that may impede the growth of the job market and
a rise in living standards is basically nonexistent. Id.
90. Id.
91. McDonnell, supra note 2, at BI.
92. Id. Mexico has seven recycling facilities nationwide, including one in Tijuana, which
has 450 maquiladoras. Id.
93. LaDou, supra note 5, at 51.
94. Id.
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are supposed to be reported to the EPA, but in 1989, there were only
twelve recorded shipments into California and Arizona.
9 5
Since the Mexican country of origin laws appear ineffective, a
more stringent set of rules must be implemented. The purpose under-
lying the country of origin laws is valid and they have the potential
to be effective, but without a proper enforcement mechanism, the
laws lack legitimacy. The Mexican government needs assistance to
legitimize their country of origin laws. Enforcement of country of
origin laws should be a potential function of a binational environ-
mental enforcement agency.
V. What Legal Remedies Will be Available to Redress the Envi-
ronmental and Personal Injuries Sustained under NAFTA?
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA)
Presently, it is unknown whether the EPA can obtain jurisdic-
tion over maquiladoras in Mexico whose environmental policies
cause hazardous health threats in the United States. If the EPA
presents evidence that hazardous waste from petrochemical plants or
maquiladoras crosses into the United States in the form of surface
and groundwater contamination, then it could possibly obtain an in-
junction or order under section 106 of CERCLA.96
The scope of U.S. jurisdiction under CERCLA is not specifi-
cally defined. CERCLA defines the term "otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" as including jurisdiction resulting
from an "international agreement to which the United States is a
party. ' 97 Pursuant to the Environmental Cooperation Agreement
signed by the United States and Mexico, 98 it is possible that this
definition could result in U.S. jurisdiction over petrochemical plant
activities occurring within one hundred kilometers of the border.
While no lawsuits have been filed in the U.S. for environmental mis-
conduct in Mexico,99 a liberal application of the CERCLA language
95. McDonnell, supra note 2, at Bi.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Section 106 states:
In addition to any other action taken by a state or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the public health or welfare of the environment because of an actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the
Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary
to abate such danger or threat ....
Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(19).
98. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., Article 4,
T.I.A.S. No. 10827. "For the purposes of this Agreement, it shall be understood that the
border area refers to the area situated 100 kilometers on either side of the inland and maritime
boundaries between the Parties." Id.
99. See Maura Dolan & Larry B. Stammer, 2 Indicted in Hauling of Toxic Waste in
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is likely to provide the U.S. with a method for obtaining jurisdiction
over U.S. owned maquiladoras conducting business within one hun-
dred kilometers of the border.
According to section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, state or federal jurisdiction
could be granted over conduct that occurs outside of the U.S. if it
causes a substantial effect within the United States and is a direct
and foreseeable -result of conduct outside the United States. 10 Juris-
diction occurs in three situations: (1) where Congress clearly in-
tended a statute to apply outside of the U.S.; (2) where the non-
applicability of a statute in a foreign country will result in adverse
effects within the U.S.; (3) where the conduct regulated by the gov-
ernment occurs within the United States. 101
Recent case law has utilized CERCLA provisions to hold do-
mestic parent companies liable for the environmental misconduct of
their domestic subsidiaries.10 2 In Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
the court found direct liability of owners and operators of a parent
company for the environmental misconduct of its subsidiary, pursu-
ant to CERCLA sections 107 and 113.103 That court cited a House
Report which stated CERCLA's principal goal of decisive action to
begin remediation of the nation's major hazardous waste sites.104
Further, a fundamental policy underlying CERCLA is to accomplish
this objective at the primary expense of responsible private parties
rather than taxpayers.105
The First Circuit found that courts are "obligated to construe
(CERCLA's) provisions liberally" in order to achieve the remedial
goals of protecting public health and the environment.0 6 Moreover,
since the improper disposal of toxic waste represents a serious prob-
lem on a national level, the development of CERCLA was based
upon the recognition of generally inadequate state level responses to
Mexico, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1990, at Al. On May 10, 1990, the first federal felony indict-
ment was announced under an environmental law in a case involving the smuggling of toxic
wastes from California to Mexico. While this incident is distinguishable from a corporation
based in Mexico which illegally and hazardously disposes of toxic chemical waste generated
from a petrochemical plant located outside of the U.S., it is a step in the right direction. Id.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 18 (1965).
101. Id.
102. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp 345, 349 (D. N.J. 1991).
103. Id.
104. Id. House Report on H.R. 7020 became the CERCLA statute. Id.
105. Id. The House Report explained that the purpose of Section 107 of CERCLA is
"to provide a mechanism for prompt recovery of monies expended for the costs of remedial
actions from persons responsible therefor and to induce such potentially liable persons to pur-
sue appropriate environmental response actions voluntarily." See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Sig-
nal,. Inc., 761 F. Supp 345, 349 (D. N.J. 1991).
106. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986).
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environmental hazards. 107
The Mobay court joined other federal courts in developing a
federal common law for determining a parent company's liability for
its subsidiary's action under CERCLA. °8 It followed the First Cir-
cuit by holding that a parent company is liable for the acts of its
subsidiary as an "operator" of an offending facility. 10 9 The court in
Kayser-Roth defined an "operator" as one having "active involve-
ment in the activities of the subsidiaries". 110 Six factors are used to
evaluate the "active involvement" standard: 1) monetary control
over accounts; 2) restriction of subsidiary's financial budget; 3) man-
date that it conduct governmental contact for the subsidiary; 4) ap-
proval of the subsidiary's lease arrangements; 5) approval of capital
transfers; and 6) placement of parent personnel in many subsidiary
director and officer positions.1 ' Other district courts, who have con-
sidered this issue, have also held parent corporations liable under
CERCLA if it controlled or participated in the subsidiary's activi-
ties. 2 To be an operator, the minimum requirement is active in-
volvement in the activities of the subsidiary.11 3 This test serves CER-
CLA's general remedial purpose of facilitating the fast and efficient
cleanup of toxic waste. 4 A district court in Vermont found a parent
corporation liable for subsidiary responsibilities as a matter of law,
without any demonstration of control.
1 1 5
While all of the CERCLA cases involve the operation of subsid-
iaries located in the United States, a liberal interpretation of the
CERCLA language could expand liability to the petrochemical com-
panies and other maquiladoras operating in Mexico. Most maqui-
107. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
The court determined that issues relating to the scope of CERCLA liability should be decided
by uniform federal rules. The court concluded that the delineation of a federal rule was consis-
tent with the legislative policies and history of CERCLA and that no compelling local interests
mandated the incorporation of state law. Id.
108. Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 351.
109. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (lst Cir. 1990). Con-
gress, by including a category in addition to owners, implied that a person who is an operator
of a facility is not protected from liability by the legal structure of ownership. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 28.
112. See United States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)
(summary judgment denied because factual issues existed with regard to direct liability); U.S.
v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202-03 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (denying parent's motion to
dismiss because as a stockholder and direct participant in management, it could be liable for
subsidiary's cleanup costs); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D.
11. 1988) (summary judgment denied because parent corporation may be liable under CER-
CLA if it actively participated in the management and control of the subsidiary's facility);
Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990) (parent corporation exten-
sively involved in affairs of subsidiary could be characterized as "owner" or "operator"); Idaho
v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986) (evidence of control over sub-
sidiary sufficient to impose liability on parent as "owner" or "operator").
113. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27.
114. Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 354.
115. See Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-32 (D. Vt. 1988).
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ladoras are completely owned by a U.S. corporation"' and therefore,
are likely to be characterized as subsidiaries. The EPA or the United
States may be able to obtain jurisdiction over the petrochemical,
plants if the U.S. based company exercises direct control over the
maquiladora's actions, especially if it controls their hazardous waste
disposal practices. In the alternative, a U.S. court could apply the
six-factor "active involvement" standard enunciated in Kayser-Roth,
in order to obtain jurisdiction and design a solution to the environ-
mental encroachment.
1 7
B. Mexican and U.S. Citizen Suits for Personal Injury
When a foreign national has suffered a personal injury in a for-
eign country as a result of a U.S. corporation's actions, suits have
been allowed in the United States."' State legislatures and courts
have embraced this concept for many years. 1 9 Under Texas law, a
resident of Matamoros, Mexico, or Brownsville, Texas would proba-
bly be able to bring a valid suit for personal injuries resulting from
toxic waste disposal practices, against a U.S. owned petrochemical
company operating in Mexico.
In Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, the court found that in cases
where all parties are nonresidents and the alleged injuries occurred
outside of the state, the court may entertain jurisdiction, although
116. FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 18, at 6.
117. See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27.
118. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex. 1990). Costa Rican resi-
dents and employees of Standard Fruit Company brought suit against Dow Chemical Co. and
Shell Oil Co. The employees claimed that they suffered personal injuries as a result of expo-
sure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a pesticide manufactured by Dow and Shell. Alfaro
sued the companies in a Texas district court and was eventually successful in maintaining a
cause of action. In ruling for the employees, the Texas Supreme Court relied on Section
71.031 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which states:
(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of
this state, of the United States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the
courts of this state, although the wrongful act, neglect, or default causing the
death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country if:
(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right
to maintain an action for damages for the death or injury;
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the
laws of this state for beginning the action; and
(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has
equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens.
(b) All matters pertaining to procedure in the prosecution or maintenance
of the action in the courts of this state are governed by the law of this state.
(c) The court shall apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate
under the facts of the case.
Id.
119. Id. In Texas, statutory predecessors of section 71.031 have existed since 1913. The
original law stated "[tihat whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this state or of
a country having equal rights with the U.S. on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be
caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default. . .such right of action may be enforced in the
courts of this state .... " 1913 TEx. GEN. LAWS 338, 338-39. Id.
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they are not bound to do so.120 In that case, the court determined
that public policy favored taking jurisdiction.121 The court concluded
that the courts of Texas had discretion in the matter of exercising
jurisdiction where all parties were nonresidents of the state, and the
cause of action arose in the state of the nonresidents.122 Conse-
quently, a state court that borders Mexico is likely to find that its
public policy would favor the exercise of the court's discretion in ob-
taining jurisdiction over claims brought by Mexican or U.S. citizens
as a result of injuries sustained from petrochemical plant operations
in Mexico. Public policy would favor the exercise of discretion in
granting jurisdiction since it would be desirable to allow citizens of
both countries to have the opportunity to redress their injuries in a
U.S. court. Furthermore, it is likely that U.S. courts would be more
sympathetic to claims resulting from petrochemical companies' un-
sound operations for two reasons. First, the Mexican judicial system
does not have the strength that U.S. courts have to enforce sanctions
or fines. Second, because of the Mexican government's favorable
view of the petrochemical industry, it would be reluctant to allow
substantial recoveries or fines against the companies due to the fear
of losing foreign investors.
VI. Recommendations for the Future
A. Structural Adjustments
1. Extraterritorial Changes.-While NAFTA represents a
comprehensive free trade arrangement which supports environmental
measures in a general manner, it does not provide any specific solu-
tions for the environmental problems at the U.S.-Mexico border. A
specific environmental treaty, drafted with strong language, is a nec-
essary step to strengthen cross-border cooperation because it could
increase the roles of the governments and environmental organiza-
tions. 123 Additionally, a treaty specifically focusing on environmental
issues would be able to address the immediate environmental
problems at the border on an issue by issue basis.
One specific provision of the proposed treaty should be a
mandatory set of environmental practice requirements for any U.S.
corporation involved in manufacturing or assembly in Mexico. 2 " A
120. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 677.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 2-2.
124. See Congressman Richard A. Gephardt, Address on the Status of the North
American Free Trade Agreement Before the Institute for International Economics, (July 27,
1992). Congressman Gephardt has suggested the creation of a code of conduct for maqui-
ladora industries. His suggestion focused on labor issues in order to provide more protection to
the Mexican employees. Id.
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similar code of conduct could be designed for environmental protec-
tion measures. Provisions would require petrochemical and other ma-
quiladoras to notify the bordering state's environmental agency, the
EPA and Sedesol of the type of operation, the pollution control
methods, estimates of air, water, and solid waste pollution, systems
for hazardous waste disposal and other relevant environmental con-
cerns. 2 5 This would assure that the governments of the United
States and Mexico, and the public would be receiving the same in-
formation about environmental threats caused by U.S. companies."2 6
The creation of a binational environmental agency would solid-
ify U.S.-Mexico cooperation and increase the environmental enforce-
ment power in the border area. 127 Such an agency could be designed
without interfering with either country's jurisdiction or sovereignty.
If environmental problems were first referred to the appropriate do-
mestic agency and sufficient action was not taken, then the bina-
tional agency could initiate its own solutions and actions. 28
In order to coordinate environmental protection measures with a
binational agency, the EPA should establish a well-funded and well-
staffed U.S.-Mexico border office whose sole area of responsibility
would be environmental concerns.12 9 Not only would the office bring
the EPA closer to the border, but it would force the EPA to be more
responsive and effective in that area.1a A border office would also
increase public involvement and scrutiny of environmental enforce-
ment procedures.' 1 Functions of a border office might conceivably
include the implementation of an environmental code of conduct, the
compilation and distribution of information concerning petrochemi-
cal and other maquiladora business practices, and the coordination
of environmental protection measures with a binational agency.
An environmental code of conduct could be codified by enacting
a Foreign Environmental Standards of Conduct Act which would re-
quire U.S.-based corporations operating in foreign countries to con-
form to U.S. environmental standards. 32 This law would require
125. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 2-3.
126. Id.
127. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 18, at 12-13. Similar ideas have been pro-
posed in Congress. In H.Con.Res. 325, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), Congressman Wyden
proposed the development of a bilateral commission to raise money for environmental protec-
tion infrastructure and clean-up projects along the U.S.-Mexico border. In S. 503, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1991), Senator McCain proposed a $10 million emergency fund for environmental
clean-up and investigation, and directed the EPA to establish an advisory committee to moni-
tor and study environmental conditions along the border. Id.
128. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 1-5.
129. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 18, at 11. In H.R. 3773, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991), Congressman Coleman proposed that the EPA establish an office in a community
locate not more than 10 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border. Id.
130. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 2-2.
131. Id.
132. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN supra note 18, at 10. In H.Res 161, 102d Cong., 2d
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maquiladoras to act in a manner in which many companies already
claim to conduct business. Many corporations claim to follow a
"functional equivalency" of U.S. environmental standards, but the
increasing amount of toxic pollution from petrochemical and other
industries proves otherwise.
133
Another option to increase the responsibility of petrochemical
companies conducting unsound environmental practices is to estab-
lish a fee on exports of hazardous waste and chemicals to Mexico
and on imports of hazardous chemicals from Mexico. 13 Hazardous
waste imported into the U.S. should not be subject to the fee because
it would promote the continued environmental abuses of waste dispo-
sal in Mexico, rather than encouraging the use of environmentally
sound disposal methods in the U.S.1 35 The proceeds from the fees
would create an EPA environmental law enforcement fund with a set
percentage allocated to the U.S.-Mexico border for environmental
enforcement. 36 Legislation implementing similar fees has been pro-
posed in conjunction with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
which would impose fees on all goods imported from countries that
do not impose water pollution standards as stringent as those re-
quired by the U.S.1 3 7 This type of fee would provide a constant
source of revenue for agencies designed to enforce the environmental
laws in the border area.
Congressman Richard Gephardt has supported the creation of a
similar transboundary tax on goods moving across the U.S.-Mexico
border.1 38 The proceeds of the tax would fund environmental cleanup
on both sides of the border and help Americans who lose their jobs
because of competition from low-paid Mexican workers. 139 While the
proposed tax and import-export fee appear to contradict the princi-
ples of free trade enunciated in NAFTA, the necessity to fund envi-
ronmental protection measures mandates a program that will provide
a continuous source of revenue.
2. Changes in the Mexican Legal System.-In order to
strengthen environmental law enforcement in Mexico, citizens of
both countries should be allowed access to U.S. courts for personal
Sess. (1991), Congressman Swift proposed that U.S. policy in trade negotiations should seek
adoption and enforcement of equivalent environmental standards among the trading nations.
id.




137. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 18, at 13-14. In S. 1965, 102d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1991), Senator Gorton proposed that the Secretary of Commerce impose such a fee. Id.
138. See Can't Do It Without Congress, L.A. Times, July 29, 1992, at B6.
139. See Stuart Auerbach, Gephardt Draws Line on Trade Pact, WASH. POST, July 28,
1992, at C4.
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injury claims against U.S.-owned petrochemical plants and other
maquiladoras operating in Mexico. Although this systemic change is
likely to create opposition from the business lobby in the U.S., 40 it is
necessary to provide Mexican citizens with the opportunity to be
compensated for actions that would be illegal had they occurred in
the United States. Presently, this is not a feasible option for Mexican
citizens because the Mexican judicial system lacks a substantial
amount of independence and an action in U.S. courts is difficult to
maintain due to venue rules favoring defendants.14' However, recent
cases demonstrate that some courts will allow foreign citizens the
opportunity to bring a cause of action for recovery against U.S. com-
panies operating abroad.' If Mexican citizens are provided access
to U.S. courts, the potential liability would be a strong incentive for
U.S.-owned maquiladoras to operate under the same environmental
standards as they would in the United States.143 The liability incen-
tive would be further strengthened if U.S. shareholders were allowed
a derivative right of action against U.S. companies operating in
Mexico. Congressman Richard Gephardt has suggested that a deriv-
ative right of action would force U.S. companies to abide by the laws
of Mexico."
Another area for improvement lies in making information con-
cerning environmental problems accessible to citizens of both coun-
tries. Revelation of information concerning permits, emission data
and environmental impact statements are available to the public
under U.S. laws, but not under Mexican laws. The Mexican environ-
mental authorities have been unwilling to release information, and
U.S. citizens may face some resistance if they seek to access environ-
mental information concerning U.S. corporations operating in Mex-
ico.' "45 Consequently, legislation is needed which would require U.S.
companies to file toxic release emission statements and copies of all
permits received from the Mexican government in order to impose
regulations similar to those that U.S. companies follow. 4 '
B. Right to Know Laws
The adoption of right to know laws could be a legislative force
140. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 1-3.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 102, 106, 107, 109, 112, 115, 118.
143. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 1-3.
144. See Congressman Gephardt, supra note 124. "I don't want our companies to be
sued. That's why this legislation (permitting a derivative right of action) will allow for a com-
pany to inoculate itself against a suit by having an environmental inspection. This would act as
a 'Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval' and preclude a suit." Id.
145. See NAFTA and the U.S./Mexico Border Environment, supra note 53, at 4-1.
146. Id. at 4-2.
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in addressing the environmental and health problems that face the
U.S.-Mexico border communities. Right to know statutes would al-
low the public to access previously confidential information on toxic
chemical pollution from corporate files of petrochemical companies
operating in Mexico.147 These laws would require companies who
produce toxic chemical pollution to publicly disclose amounts, loca-
tion, and methods of storage and disposal.1" 8 Congressman Gephardt
has suggested that border communities need to expand their right to
know statutes to require U.S. companies doing business in Mexico,
within 100 kilometers of the border, to inform the public of any re-
lease of toxic substances.' 49 He further maintains that similar legis-
lation on Mexico's behalf is a necessary step for the enforcement of
environmental measures.""
From an individual citizen's standpoint, right to know laws im-
prove the public's knowledge of the health and environmental risks
caused by the disposal of hazardous waste.1 51 Increased public
knowledge will result in broader public participation in environmen-
tal protection movements. Also, these statutes would substantially
benefit the workforce employed at maquiladoras because they will
provide employees with information about hazardous conditions in
the workplace.152 Currently, U.S. labor unions, who are attempting
to guarantee affirmative rights for union members, utilize the con-
cept behind right to know laws. 5 The programs would provide sup-
port for workers injured as a result of company environmental poli-
cies, reduce workplace hazards and mandate safer working
conditions.
5 4
Moreover, right to know statutes would be a significant help to
the media in the investigation of hazardous waste and environmental
problems. 55 In order to inform the public, the media needs relevant
information and a "meaningful context to evaluate pollution."' 5 6 The
vast resources available to the media would allow them to utilize
right to know laws to their greatest potential.
Furthermore, legislators need timely information from maqui-
ladoras in order to identify environmental problems, evaluate poli-
cies, develop solutions, and implement effective pollution prevention
147. See The Right to Know-the Right to Act, BORDER CAMPAIGN BACKGROUND ARTI-
CLE #4, (Border Campaign, Brownsville, TX) 1992.
148. Id.
149. See Congressman Gephardt, supra note 124.
150. Id.





156. See The Right to Know-the Right to Act, supra note 147.
[Vol. 11:3
NAFTA AND THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
laws.157 If the law-makers use the right to know laws to their fullest
extent, then they can work with emergency planners and response
teams to establish a public planning structure which would utilize
current information to plan for chemical emergencies.
15 8
Right to know statutes would also affect industry and its regula-
tors in a positive manner. In the past, public disclosure has influ-
enced high level decision makers and has strengthened the role of
environmental managers in some U.S. corporations. 15 With the use
of such statutes, industry regulators would be able to improve their
evaluation of current industry policies and priorities. 160
The current right to know laws do not apply to the 1800 U.S.
owned maquiladoras located in Mexico.' If Congressman
Gephardt's proposition to impose the laws on U.S. companies con-
ducting business within 100 kilometers of the U.S.-Mexico border is
implemented, then the citizens in the border communities are likely
to become more proactive because they will be receiving informa-
tion.' 62 The increase in knowledge of the environmental practices of
the petrochemical plants will lead to a better equipped and organized
public participation base, which will provide a foundation for effec-
tive environmental protection.' With public participation, informa-
tion concerning the inherent hazards of the industry will have a
meaningful impact on the citizens. Finally, if the legislators give the
emergency planning committees consistent funding, they will be able
to provide the workforce and industry personnel with useful informa-
tion and a clear mandate to prevent and plan for chemical
accidents.164
VII. Conclusion
The United States and Mexico face an alarming situation. The
U.S, views NAFTA as a mechanism to offset the trading power of
the European Community. Mexico views NAFTA as the opportunity
to become part of a superpower trading bloc, and significantly in-
crease its potential for higher annual revenues. NAFTA's implemen-
tation will cause a surge in industrial growth at the U.S.-Mexico
border, fulfilling Mexico's goal of increased revenue. Unfortunately,
continued development at the border will exacerbate the present irre-






162. See Congressman Gephardt, supra note 124.
163. See The Right to Know-the Right to Act, supra note 147.
164. Id.
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life on both sides of the border.
Both the U.S. and Mexico must begin to make necessary struc-
tural adjustments at the border. Otherwise, the countries will ulti-
mately mandate a situation that demonstrates that free trade under
NAFTA is a much higher priority than the condition of the environ-
ment and its coinciding adverse health effects on the citizens of both
countries.
Sloan Rappoport
